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Summary: In two recent contributions Alain Parguez and Jean-Gabriel Bliek argued in 
favour of assigning a full employment objective to European economic policies and their 
coordination (Bliek and Parguez (2007) and Parguez (2007b)). Their argument is based 
on the approach of the monetary circuit, whose treatment of full employment is the ob-
ject of this article. The approach is presented here as emblematic of “out of equilibrium” 
models, i.e. models where the equilibrium conditions of pure competition are not ful-
filled. A forthcoming contribution will show how the description of economic reality 
suggested by the circuit can help interpreting recent macroeconomic developments in the 
US, Canada, Japan and the EU and will discuss some empirical studies confirming its 
relevance for policy analysis. 
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Introduction and background:  
 
A majority of people agrees that full employment is a desirable target from an 
ethical point of view. However, in many European countries full employment 
was abandoned as an active policy objective. This is due in part to the fact that 
the monetarist concept of the natural rate of unemployment has become an es-
sential element of what Arestis and Sawyer (2004) call the New Consensus, a 
macroeconomic model that summarises the mainstream views concerning the 
effects of monetary and fiscal policy (Meyer (2001), Mc Callum (2001)). For the 
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New Consensus unemployment is natural, or must in any case remain at its 
“Non-Accelerating of Inflation” level (NAIRU). Hence policies to fight against 
it are viewed as harmful, and entail the risk to accelerate inflation. As noted by 
Fitoussi and Le Cacheux (2005, p. 108), a variant of the New Consensus, refer-
ring to the New Classical Economics seems also to be the main argument used in 
justifying EU post-Maastricht monetary and budgetary policies
1. In a world 
where decision-makers tend to focus on the short-term political cycle and to 
avoid political responsibility for decisions on controversial matters, solutions 
inspired by consensus appear more reassuring than alternatives based on hetero-
doxy (Deleplace and Morrisson, 1985)
2. 
Conceptually, “consensus” approaches can be brought back to a relatively 
simple version of the pure competition model developed by Léon Walras and 
other early neo-classical economists at the turn of the XIX century. Applied me-
chanically, it makes it hard to defend any active form of policy intervention. 
Barone (1908) noted already long ago the formal equivalence between Walras’ 
model and the pure command economy, which might explain the fascination it 
exerts on economists at both extremes of the ideological spectrum. 
If Walras model is taken as a limit case that applies under ideal condi-
tions
3, and rigorous thinking is applied to examine what happens when these 
conditions are not fulfilled, the justification for a full-employment objective and 
in general for active economic policy intervention becomes clear
4. This is the 
route followed by “out of neo-classical equilibrium” approaches, particularly the 
analyses developed in the last decades by Parguez and others under the heading 
of general theory of the monetary circuit, whose application to the assessment of 
full employment policies is the object of this review. 
The distinctive feature of the circuit is its treatment of money as origi-
nated by credit and its focus on the macroeconomy. At the beginning of the cir-
cuit, production prices are fixed by enterprises by adding a mark-up on their ex-
                                                 
1 Fitoussi and Saraceno (2004) identified a Washington-Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus. 
2 Eric Perée noted orally that the distinction between orthodox and heterodox economics is of 
doubtful relevance since a good proportion of “mainstream economists” are actually Catholics. In 
the same ironical vein, one can also note that according to Nicola (1994), General Equilibrium 
Theory would be “Catholic”, a qualification by which he intends to characterise its tolerance for 
alternative analytical approaches.  
3 The idea of looking at the pure competitive model as a limit case of more realistic and general 
social models is borrowed from Leroy (1983, in particular the suggestive chart 6.1 “Le carré des 
éventualités”, p. 264). This idea is also implicit in the concept of the “core” of an exchange econ-
omy, developed in the literature on the theory of games, where however it is often presented as a 
justification for the use of equilibrium analysis. A formal systematisation of what happens when 
some of the neo-classical assumptions are relaxed, while keeping reference to the other microeco-
nomic “optimising” premises, was also developed by the “rationing approach”, which was devel-
oped starting from the 1970s by Drèze, Malinvaud, Benassy and others (see also par. 3.2). 
4 Alain Parguez noted orally that Walras would have been shocked by the simplistic way in which 
his model, and its “fairy equilibrium conditions”, is used today in the policy debate.  Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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pected costs, based on their expectations concerning effective demand. Once 
validated by the banking sector through the granting of credits, the plans of en-
terprises originate a monetary flow that starts the circuit of wages, income and 
expenditures. At the end of this circuit, when enterprises recover through their 
sales the money they advanced as cost, they repay back their loans to the banks 
and credit money ceases to exist
5.  
The circuit shares a number of elements with other approaches that relate 
the Keynesian heritage to the “classical tradition”
6, such as post-Keynesian and 
Sraffian analyses
7. With reference to the neo-classical definition of equilibrium, 
these features allow qualifying the circuit as an “out of equilibrium” approach, 
although it may also be viewed as a generalisation of the neo-classical model, 
since, like the post-Keynesian and Sraffian analyses, it admits walrasian equilib-
rium as a possible special case. 
By definition, “out of neo-classical equilibrium” some form of inconsis-
tency prevails between the plans of the economic agents or social groups that 
compose society. Economic policy can thus have a positive role in restoring con-
sistency between divergent economic plans. It is argued below that, because of 
their capacity to address real world problems, post–Keynesian “disequilibrium” 
approaches are mature to serve as analytical foundations for alternative Euro-
pean economic policies, going beyond the traditional recipes, dubbed politiques 
de l’impuissance by Fitoussi (2005). 
The argument developed by Parguez and Bliek is supported by an empiri-
cal analysis concerning several countries and different historical periods that will 
be reviewed in a forthcoming article. It builds also upon their previous book: Le 
plein emploi ou le chaos, in which they made a pitiless diagnose of the economic 
situation and the policies followed in the last decades in France and in Europe 
(Bliek and Parguez (2006)), and on other recent related studies (Giovannoni and 
Parguez (2007)). 
In section 2 below some historical background is given on the genesis of 
the theory of the circuit. Section 3 discusses the relations between the circuit and 
                                                 
5 In a pure credit economy (see section 2), where the only form of liquidity is represented by the 
liabilities of the consolidated banking sector and where the Government is absent, money can only 
be created when banks extend credits to the rest of economy. It exists and it is used during the 
production cycle to pay wages and cover other costs and purchases of final products and it is de-
stroyed when loans are repaid. This channel of monetary creation and destruction remains in more 
realistic models where for instance a legal tender is introduced (see Graziani (2003 pp. 82-87)). 
6 Economists like Smith, Ricardo and Marx, are qualified as “classical”, in contrast with Jevons, 
Menger and Walras, who promoted the “marginalistic revolution” of the late XIX century, who are 
called “neo–classics” (see for instance Roncaglia and Sylos Labini (2002)). 
7 Roncaglia (1999) identifies three directions in which the analysis of Sraffa was prolonged by his 
Italian scholars with a view to “reconstruct” the classical approach: the “ricardian” direction taken 
by Pasinetti, the “marxian” approach associated with Garegnani and the “smithian” avenue fol-
lowed by Sylos-Labini, the latter being seen by Roncaglia as the most promising for a possible 
synthesis of the three. Massimo Cingolani 
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post-Keynesian and Sraffian approaches, whereas section 4 addresses its specific 
contribution to the analysis of money. Sections 5 and 6 review in detail the main 
analytical tools of the circuit put forward in the recent contributions of Parguez 
and Bliek, mentioning the full-cost pricing principle (section 5) and Kalecki’s 
saving-investment identity (section 6). The application of these tools to the in-
terpretation of international macroeconomic evidence is discussed in a forthcom-
ing article, together with other empirical evidence supporting the vision of the 
circuit. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
1.  Historical origins of the monetary circuit 
 
The idea of an economy as a circular process of production and exchange can be 
traced back to the XVIII century’s French physiocrats, who looked at the circu-
lation of wealth in analogy with the circulation of blood. Before physiocrats, 
William Petty had noted that money resembles fat more than blood: a little bit of 
it is needed and it adds beauty to those who have it already, but too much is un-
healthy (Roncaglia (1977)).  
The XVIII century vision of circulation concerned goods and services; 
money really entered into the picture only at the end of the XIX century, with 
the Swedish economist Wicksell (1898), who developed the concept of a credit 
economy, whereby money is treated as a liability issued by the banking sector 
when it extends credit. Wicksell influenced many authors of the Austrian and the 
German schools and particularly the Moravian-born Schumpeter: cf. Sylos Lab-
ini (1971), Graziani (2003, chap. 4), Messori (2004).  
On money Schumpeter followed the tradition of the banking school, like 
his tutor: von Wieser, in particular the idea that banks create credit money inde-
pendently from accumulated deposits (Schumpeter (1954, Vol III, p. 472)). In 
XIX century Great Britain, the banking school’s position that loans make depos-
its went against the currency school’s contention that deposits make loans. The 
latter was accepted by the other main pupil of von Wieser: von Hayek, as well as 
by Wicksell, Leon Walras and later Milton Friedman and the neo-monetarists. 
Arena (2004) noted that it is somewhat paradoxical that von Wieser was also one 
of the founders of the marginalistic revolution. Being himself a marginalistic 
economist, Wicksell exerted a major influence on the Stockholm school (Myr-
dal, Lindhal, Ohlin, Lundberg) and on Keynes’ Treatise on Money, which, to-
gether with the post-General Theory articles appeared on the Economic Journal 
(Graziani (2003, pp. 64 and 69)), has been a major source of inspiration for the 
modern analysis of the circuit. 
However Keynes’ Treatise diverged from Wicksell’s model on two im-
portant points: it adhered to the banking school’s theses and, on income distribu-
tion, rejected the marginalistic approach (Graziani (2003, pp. 97-98)). The mod-Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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ern circuit adopts in turn a variant of the Treatise‘s approach to distribution that 
goes back to the Polish economist Kalecki (1933, pp. 43-47 and 51-55, 1938 and 
1954). Amongst other antecedents of the circuit, one can mention also the Ger-
man writings on the Kreislauf inspired by Schumpeter, a literature reviewed in 
Schmitt and Greppi (1996). Graziani (2003) lists also as a predecessor Sylos 
Labini (1948), a paper where the influence of Schumpeter, with whom Sylos 
studied, is apparent. Finally many elements of the monetary circuit are present in 
the Accumulation of Capital of Joan Robinson (1956)
 8.  
Whereas these are the forerunners, the modern monetary circuit owes 
much to the work done starting from the 1960s by the French Le Bourva (1962), 
Schmitt (1966), and Parguez (1975, 1981, 1984 and 1996), the Canadians Lavoie 
(1987) and Seccareccia (1984, 1994 and 1996) and the Italian Graziani (1984 
and 2003)
9.  
 
 
2.  Links of the circuit with other non-walrasian approaches 
 
Neo-classical analysis takes Walras’ definition of competitive equilibrium as the 
main reference. Following this tradition and its terminology, any “position of 
rest” of a model that departs from the set of rather stringent conditions character-
ising walrasian equilibrium could thus be referred to as a “non-walrasian equilib-
rium” or as ”disequilibrium”. Obviously, in any such position, the prices that 
prevail in the economy diverge from those guaranteeing optimality under the 
other assumptions retained by the walrasian model and associated with the con-
cept of “perfect competition”. These assumptions are for instance the staticity 
(or stationarity) of the model, the absence of fundamental uncertainty, the con-
vexity of the consumption and production sets, free entry, etc. The optimality 
obtained under these assumptions implies in turn properties such as the equality 
between demand and supply in all markets (“market clearing”), maximum effi-
ciency in production and consumption, zero extra-profits or quasi-rents, full em-
                                                 
8 There is a debate on the extent to which Robinson’s (1956) Accumulation of Capital, one of the 
masterpieces of the post-Keynesian literature, can be seen or not at the origin of the modern con-
cept of the monetary circuit. Although Parguez (2005) agrees with Graziani (1989), Lavoie (1999) 
and Rochon (1999) that some important elements of the circuit are present in this book, mainly 
contained in chapters 23-24, he nonetheless argued that these elements are not essential in the 
development of its main line of argument, which concerns the critique of the concept of capital 
(see par. 3.2 below).  
9 Possibly because of the language, these contributions have not been immediately integrated in 
the standard economic curricula of the main American and European universities. Excellent sur-
veys in English on the modern theory of the circuit are Parguez and Seccareccia (2000) and 
Graziani (2003). See also Rochon (1999). A general post-Keynesian reference, integrating both the 
monetary circuit and the “Cambridge UK” tradition, is Lavoie (1992). Massimo Cingolani 
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ployment, full capacity utilisation, etc., all conditions that, by definition, are not 
complied with “out of equilibrium”. 
 
Three strongly interrelated “disequilibrium” features that the circuit shares with 
the post-Keynesian and Sraffian analyses are discussed in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 
below:  
i)  the choice for a dynamic approach;  
ii)  the “Kaleckian” modelling of pricing and distribution, which implies 
that: 
-  it is not possible to measure capital independently from distribution,  
-  there is in general no inverse relation between capital and labour 
quantities and their remuneration, 
-  unused capacity and involuntary unemployment are likely also in 
the long run;  
iii) the presence of “extra-profits” or “quasi-rents”, which in the case of un-
certainty exceed “ex-post risk”.  
 
These features jointly characterise the “out of equilibrium” conditions of the cir-
cuit, which can also be assumed to be typical of “out of equilibrium” conditions 
in general. As argued in par. 3.4, under such conditions policy recommendations 
go beyond the “passive” removal of obstacles to the spontaneous self-regulation 
of the market. 
 
2.1  Dynamics: Through the concept of surplus, whose realisation is the pre-
condition for accumulation, classical economists addressed the dynamic issue of 
reproduction, focusing on production economies in historical time. In contrast, 
the neo-classics applied their mathematical optimisation approach to an intrinsi-
cally static world where resources are given (Sylos Labini (2005)), focusing on 
de facto exchange economies in logical time.  
With her usual aplomb, J.  Robinson (1978, p.12) defined the term 
post-Keynesian as relating to “an economic theory or method of analysis which 
takes into account of the difference between the future and the past”, a plausible 
pre-requisite for policy intervention, but that goes against Friedman’s (1953) 
celebrated aphorism according to which the degree of realism of a theory is ir-
relevant and only its predictive power counts.  
The model of the circuit is fully dynamic because it focuses on the se-
quence between money creation and its destruction as well as on the related dis-
tinction between initial finance and final finance (Graziani (1984b, 1985 and 
1987)). As such it allows for causality. Robinson noted in this respect that: “In a 
model depicting equilibrium positions there is no causation. … At any moment 
in logical time, the past is determined just as much as the future. In an historical Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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model, causal relations have to be specified. Today is a break of time between 
an unknown future and an irrevocable past” (1962, quoted in Harcourt, (1975)). 
 
2.2  Prices and distribution: At the start of the circuit, production prices are 
fixed by the producers in order to cover expected costs and provide for a certain 
amount of surplus, on the basis of a mark-up on these costs. As developed by 
Graziani (for instance 2003 pp. 100-105), mark-up pricing forms the basis of the 
monetary prices theory of the circuit. Its origin can be traced back to Kalecki 
(1954, chap. 1) and it is also retained by the post-Keynesian and Sraffian analy-
ses of inflation (see section 5 below). Prices defined on the basis of a mark-up 
on costs do not necessarily clear markets for goods and services. 
Graziani (2003 p. 24-25) underlined that Kalecki’s theory of distribution 
is another main point of convergence between post-Keynesian and circuit ana-
lysts. Kaleckian distribution is related to mark-up pricing and notably implies 
that the neo-classical first order conditions for the maximisation of producer’s 
profits do not hold, i.e. the real rate of interest is not equal to the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital and the real wage is different from the marginal productivity 
of labour, which introduces in turn a causality between investment and savings 
(see section 6 below). In such circumstances distribution retroacts on growth 
(Pasinetti (2000)) and thus allocation cannot be separated from distribution, as it 
is the case in the neo-classical approach. The fact that marginal factor price rela-
tions do not hold also implies that at any time capital is “non-optimal” with re-
spect to the generated level of effective demand and hence installed capacity is 
not fully used.  
The widely documented existence of idle production capacities illustrates 
the relevance of the “disequilibrium” theoretical critique Joan Robinson ad-
dressed to the neo-classical concept of capital. As noted by Schefold (1997a, p. 
440)), idle capacities mean that when determining “market clearing prices”, it is 
not possible to assume as given an optimal quantity of capital:  
“Either one is situated in the short period, and then the expectations gener-
ated yesterday are among the data of the problem … One has to determine 
whether effective demand will allow to use equipment and other available re-
sources fully. Or one considers a long-period analysis and then the amounts 
of capital needed in the permanent state are variables to be determined, not 
data of the problem.” (Schefold (1997a, p. 440)).  
 
Robinson’s critique was further developed in the capital controversy between 
the two Cambridge (UK and Massachusetts) in the sixties and the seventies 
(Harcourt (1975), Pasinetti (2000)). This further illustrated Sraffa’s point that 
capital cannot be measured independently from distribution, a logical implica-
tion of being “out of equilibrium”. The reswitching debate also demonstrated 
that it is not appropriate to assume a monotonic inverse relation between the Massimo Cingolani 
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quantity of capital and its remuneration, as well as between the quantity of la-
bour and the real wage. 
This criticism was originally understood to apply only to the traditional 
version of the neo-classical model, developed by Walras, Menger and Wicksell 
and applied to unemployment by Pigou (notably first in 1933 and last in 1950). 
Indeed, Roncaglia and Toveronanchi (1985) underlined the formal analogy be-
tween the analysis of unemployment of Pigou, the standard treatment of unem-
ployment by the neo-classical synthesis provided by Modigliani (1944 and 
1963) and the monetarist model of unemployment of Friedman (1970), all of 
which are de facto general equilibrium models. They noted in particular that in 
all of the three models the capital critique implies the logical impossibility of 
considering the demand for labour as an inverse function of the real wage. 
Hence persistent unemployment of classical type can exist, even with full capac-
ity utilisation, implying that: “competitive labour markets do not ensure long-
run full employment equilibrium”. 
Following a better understanding of Garegnani’s (1964, 1965 and 1976) 
points, authors that reviewed the matter recently concluded that the capital cri-
tique applies also to the Arrow-Debreu intertemporal model (Debreu, 1959), 
core of the modern neo-classical theory, as well as to the temporary equilibrium 
model, the neo-classical variant that today is used more frequently in macroeco-
nomic applications (see for instance Petri (1999, 2003 and 2004), Garegnani 
(2003) and Schefold (1997a))
10.  
Two sophisticated developments of the temporary equilibrium literature 
are the overlapping generation model of Allais and Samuelson and the rationing 
equilibria approach developed by Drèze, Malinvaud, Benassy and others. The 
overlapping generation model introduced money in the neo-classical framework, 
but only in its reserve function (not for the finance motive) and at the price of 
assumptions even stronger than those of the standard neo-classical model. The 
rationing literature developed a rigorous analysis of what happens out of walra-
sian equilibrium based on the aggregation of microeconomic optimising behav-
iour, but in a context where money is essentially irrelevant. Both approaches use 
relatively sophisticated mathematics, which tends to obscure the fact that the 
capital critique applies to them as well, as to all other temporary equilibrium 
models.  
In conclusion with mark-up pricing and Kaleckian distribution involun-
tary unemployment is a likely outcome even in the long-run (see also Lavoie 
(1987 chap. 4 and 1992 pp. 26-41)) and Schefold (1997a p. 441)). It results from 
the dynamic through which effective demand is generated by endogenous 
money, generally at a level insufficient to guarantee full employment. 
                                                 
10 Donzelli (1988) traces temporary equilibrium back to Von Hayek (1928 and 1937), Lindhal 
(1928 and 1930) and Hicks (1933 and 1939). Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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Samuelson’s (1965) early contention that, although formally correct, the re-
switching critique is of negligible interest from the empirical point of view, Joan 
Robinson (1975) “final word” as well as Hahn’s (1972 and 1982) critical as-
sessment of the neo-ricardians are therefore outdated.  
Paradoxically, the capital controversies  can be retained as having por-
tended to the Lucas critique (1972 and 1975), which can be extremely simplified 
as having shown that economic policy and the econometric instruments used to 
evaluate it are irrelevant in a context of pure competition, since they will be “op-
timised-out” by the equilibrium conditions (cf. 3.4). 
 
2.3  Profits and uncertainty: In a neo-classical static and deterministic perfect 
competition case under decreasing returns and free entry pure profit in the sense 
of capital remuneration
11 (or extra-profit or also quasi-rent) would tend to zero 
in the long run (Mas Colell et al. (1995), p. 335). In a multi-sectoral model this 
tendency would be common to all sectors.  
Classical equilibria imply instead the uniformity of profit rates across sec-
tors (inclusive of interest), but not necessarily their convergence towards zero 
extra-profits. Moreover, in the classical approach the economy is seen as gravi-
tating towards the long-period equilibrium without ever reaching it, thus never 
achieving the uniformity of profit rates across sectors. In the neoclassical model 
the role of logical time can instead be interpreted as implying the assumption of 
full and instantaneous convergence to equilibrium (Kurz and Salvadori (2003)), 
which in many comparative static applications, including standard cost-benefit 
analysis, is assumed to be the zero-extra-profit equilibrium. 
Paraphrasing Davidson (1994 p. 88), it can be noted as typical of all 
post-Keynesian approaches that the future is uncertain and, contrary to risk 
                                                 
11 The terms profit, interest, rent, quasi-rent, extra-profits etc are used with different meanings in 
the literature. The excess of firm’s revenues over production costs (the surplus) appears to be an 
intuitive concept, but its interpretation depends on how production costs are defined. Many under-
stand pure profits as the remuneration of physical capital, interest as the remuneration of credit 
capital, rent as the remuneration of land and generally non-produced factors of production and 
Marshallian quasi-rent any remaining residual, covering also the “exceptional” remuneration of 
the entrepreneur (Schumpeter (1954), Vol. III, p. 251). Classical economists defined profit as the 
revenue of the class of capitalists and included in it both interest and risk remuneration. At the 
other extreme sometimes profits (or extra-profits) are defined as quasi-rents, with reference to the 
“exceptional” remuneration perceived by the entrepreneur, as distinct from that of the capitalist, 
which excludes both interest and the normal remuneration of capital. Under long-term conditions 
of pure competition (including free entry), marginal costs, which equals price under competitive 
conditions, tends towards the minimum of average costs implying that pure profits or capital re-
muneration tend to zero in the deterministic case and to the risk premium when ergodic uncer-
tainty is present (see footnote 12). The term rent is also often used to cover all elements of the 
surplus that are above normal profits under competitive conditions, for instance monopoly profits, 
i.e. all firms net revenues except interest and a “normal” risk premium (see also Perroux (1926, pp. 
324-334)).  Massimo Cingolani 
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(Knight (1921)), cannot be reduced to actuarial certainty by probability state-
ments, hence expectations can not be “rational”. Without rational expectations, 
there cannot be “equilibrium” in any neo-classically accepted meaning of the 
term (Hahn 2003b). Indeed, to respect more faithfully the spirit of Keynes’ 
ideas, Davidson refuses Samuelson’s ergodicity assumption
12, which is a neces-
sary condition for stochastic optimisation and is thus implicit in the neoclassical 
model when the latter is extended to risk. If uncertainty is non-ergotic, the econ-
omy is almost by definition always in “disequilibrium”, or in an equilibrium that 
is non-walrasian. On the contrary, in the presence of rational expectations and 
given the other conditions retained for the definition of a walrasian equilibrium, 
prices clear all markets and ensure the compatibility between the plans of all the 
participants in the economy, rendering money and economic policy redundant 
(see below 3.4 and 4).  
In a situation of radical or fundamental uncertainty, the identity between 
risk and profit breaks down and it is no longer possible to meaningfully distin-
guish profit from “extra-profit” or rent. For instance, with reference to a static 
and deterministic neo-classical model any deviation from zero-profits observed 
in reality would appear as a temporary rent or quasi-rent, measuring the distance 
between surplus in a given moment of historical time and the theoretical opti-
mum of prices equal to marginal costs and null profits that the walrasian equilib-
rium would reach in logical time under free entry. Extending this simplified 
framework to uncertainty, the zero extra-profit long-term equilibrium becomes 
positive and equal to the risk premium. However, as in a non-ergotic environ-
ment uncertainty cannot be addressed by rational calculus, the “surplus” realised 
ex post over incurred production costs will include both an element of profit 
compensation for risk actually incurred and an element of rent or quasi-rent, al-
though it is not possible to say how much because there is no obvious norm of 
comparison like the zero profit condition in the deterministic case. A fortiori 
there is no way to establish how much of the expected surplus is profit and how 
much is rent ex ante. This is also the reason why, in the initial phases of the cir-
cuit, banks are assumed to finance both a normal remuneration of capital 
(“profit”) and an element of rent (see the cost identity in section 5). 
A more indirect consequence of radical uncertainty is that the pricing of 
financial products based on the “no arbitrage assumption” (Demange and La-
roque, 2001, chapter 2) is arbitrary and the more irrelevant the more the econ-
omy is far from equilibrium, something which might help explaining how finan-
cial imbalances accumulate. 
Rather than an empty theoretical debate devoid of practical implications, 
the capital controversies of the 1960s and their interpretation in a context of uncer-
                                                 
12 Non-ergodicity means that probability depends on time, or more precisely, that the parameters 
of the probability distributions of the events shaping expectations, and the distributions them-
selves, depend on time and the events are thus unforeseeable. Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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tainty appear thus as an illustration of the link between the analysis of disequilib-
rium and the fact that capital cannot be measured independently from distribution. 
By giving a rationale for questioning the internal consistency of the neo-classical 
model, they point towards the “classical” approach as a possible alternative.  
 
2.4  Policy implications of disequilibrium: Be it for the treatment of time, the 
focus on exchange versus production, the full employment assumption, or for 
other reasons, there is little doubt that the neo-classical approach, and particu-
larly the modern walrasian general equilibrium variant, is more abstract from 
reality than the analyses of the classical economists and, apart from a generic 
support for laissez faire, less prone to providing concrete policy advice.  
It is indeed often asserted by neo-classical purists that there is no need for 
economic policy action unless some external factor disturbs the self-regulating 
market mechanism. Guesnerie (2001 and 2005) noted that even when market 
clearing conditions are fulfilled and expectations are rational, multiple equilibria 
can arise and therefore there is still some limited room for policy choice. But the 
evidence “provides, to say the least, only mixed support” in favour of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis (2005, p. 389). Accordingly there is a more im-
portant policy role for the Government in addressing this “expectational market 
failure”, an idea that Guesnerie traces back to Massé (1965) and that is also in-
dependently retained by Parguez (see section 6 below). 
The policy recommendations arrived at in situation of disequilibrium are 
to regulate effective demand so as to keep the economy on the full employment 
path, and are in fact equivalent in their effects to the policy recommendations 
resulting from the traditional Keynesian multiplier, which although normally 
introduced in models of the neo-classical synthesis variety, was recognised by 
Samuelson to have an intrinsically “non-walrasian” nature
13.  
 
3. The circuit as an endogenous money approach focusing on the role of banks  
 
Within the “disequilibrium” approaches, the distinctive feature of the theory of 
the circuit is that it places the macroeconomic role of money at the centre of the 
                                                 
13 In the lecture he gave on the occasion of receiving the prize of the Bank of Sweden in memory 
of Alfred Nobel Samuelson noted: “… the accelerator-multiplier … provides a typical example of 
a dynamic system that can in no useful sense be related to a maximum problem.” P. Samuelson 
(1970). See also the original article of Kahn (1931), Kalecki’s independent version (1933, 1935 
and 1954), as well as Harcourt and Dalziel’s characterisation of the multiplier in a sequential 
framework (1997). In the circuit literature one can note Schmitt’s (1972) rejection of the notion of 
“multiplier” in favour of that of “multiplicand” and Parguez’s definition of the multiplier between 
expected profits and employment as the reciprocal of the expected level of firm’s mark-up, which 
makes extremely clear the link between the employment multiplier, uncertainty and distribution  
(2007b, p. 18, equation 11). Massimo Cingolani 
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analysis, developing Keynes’ concept of a monetary production economy 
(Keynes (1933))
14. One of the peculiar features of such an economy is that it is 
not sufficient to study the individual behaviour of the participants taken in isola-
tion to understand how the aggregate works in the whole, contrary to the tradi-
tional neoclassical methods that rely heavily on the aggregation of individual 
behaviour
15.  
Neo-classical micro-based models focus attention on situations of “equi-
librium” that could be reached without any need for introducing money, typi-
cally in a barter economy. It is increasingly recognised that these analyses failed 
in providing a satisfactory explanation for the existence and role played by 
money. One of the most renowned mainstream economists, Frank Hahn
16, noted 
the inconsistencies in the neoclassical treatment of money more than 40 years 
ago (Hahn (1965)). Recently he came to suggest that there could be “macroeco-
nomic foundations for microeconomics” (Hahn (2003a))
17, an idea that goes in 
the direction of the macroeconomic postulates retained in the post-Keynesian 
analyses and in the circuit literature.  
In the circuit money exists to remove the scarcity constraint and allow 
producers and consumers to realise their plans. It is macroeconomic in the sense 
that the plans that are the basis for the provision of liquidity by banks are those 
of the social groups involved in the process of money creation and destruction. 
In this context, the distinction between banks and the rest of private producers, 
which is not made in the neo-classical or in the standard post-Keynesian models, 
is crucial. The role of the banking sector, inclusive also of the central bank, is to 
produce liquidity at the request of firms, households, the State or the foreign sec-
tor. In the absence of corrective action from the State, the plans of domestic and 
foreign households and firms can be inconsistent between each other, resulting 
in macroeconomic imbalances such as unemployment and inflation. The State 
can create money to finance its deficit and thus compensate for these inconsis-
tencies (see section 6 on Kalecki’s identity). The two main possible channels of 
liquidity creation (State and banks) have different impacts on prices and interest 
rates (Graziani , (1983, 1984a and 2003, Ch. 7)). 
                                                 
14 This was the title that Keynes gave to the course he gave in Cambridge in the summer of 1932 
and was also the provisional title given to the draft of the General Theory (Fontana and Realfonzo 
(2005)). Between 1984 and 1996 Alain Parguez has been editor of Monnaie et Production, one of 
the series of Economies et Sociétés, a revue published by the ISMEA of François Perroux. This 
series has been an important forum of debate between the French and the international circuit 
scholars.  
15 The rejection of “methodological individualism” by the circuit is stated clearly in 
Graziani (2003) pp. 18-21. 
16 Hahn is co-author of the often quoted Arrow and Hahn (1971), for many years the standard ad-
vanced reference presenting the “core” of the neoclassical paradigm. 
17 Based on his analysis of the macroeconomic role of money, Parguez (1975) abandoned the neo-
classical equilibrium approach much earlier. Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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4. The circuit’s analysis of inflation  
 
The dynamic of money creation and destruction is driven by producers’ expecta-
tions implicit in their cost-plus pricing behaviour. Mark-up pricing based on the 
full-cost principle forms the basis of the post-Keynesian, Sraffian and circuit 
analyses of inflation. Parguez (2007b) derives the mark-up equation from the 
following version of the cost identity:  
Y = αLp = wL(1+ r*)(1+
R
Y
)+ U. 
In this identity: 
Y   is output in monetary terms  
α   is the average productivity of labour  
L   is the level of employment  
p   are average domestic production prices  
r*   is the target rate of profit 
R   is the net interest income (net of taxes) and  
U   is the cost associated with a “too low” or “too high” capital utilisation, an 
adjustment factor reflecting the sub-optimal level of capacity utilisation.  
 
The identity assumes that a mark-up is added on labour costs to cover targeted 
profits and interest costs, as well as the costs associated with the “disequilib-
rium” level of capital utilisation. Having expressed R in proportion of nominal 
output Y, expressing U in proportion of real output αL, and noting these ratios 
respectively λ and σ, the following version of the mark-up equation is obtained 
dividing by real output αL: 
p =
w
α
(1+ r*)(1+ λ)+ σ  
where w/α represents also unit labour costs, i.e. labour costs divided by output. 
Given that λ and r* are exogenous policy induced factors, which can be consid-
ered constant in the short run, prices increase when either unit labour costs in-
crease or when the factor σ increases.  
In a neoclassical equilibrium, producers are on their long-run minimum 
average cost curve, so that σ = 0. With unchanged technology competition 
brings capital remuneration to zero thus, r*=0, while the rate of interest is equal 
to its long-period or natural value λ=λ, which depends on the savings-
investment balance and is thus indeterminate. Interesting positions are the maxi-
mum efficiency zero interest of Allais (1947, pp.184-197), the dynamic efficiency 
level foreseen by overlapping generation models, which is in excess of the 
growth rate of the economy in real terms (Delacroix and Michel (2002, p. 84)), 
or the golden rule level, equal to the economy’s growth rate (Phelps, 1965). Massimo Cingolani 
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They are all compatible with the neo-classical interpretation of the price equa-
tion as long as prices equal unit costs and thus all costs are covered without gen-
erating a surplus.  
Parguez (2007b) argues that in a dynamic economy running close to full 
employment increases in unit labour costs w/α are unlikely, because in a growth 
environment wage increases are normally more than compensated by the pro-
ductivity growth induced by investment, a point which is partially confirmed by 
the known fact that the behaviour of productivity is pro-cyclical (Kaldoor-
Verdoorn law) as well as by the historical episodes of the European reconstruc-
tion of the 1950s and the “Clinton’s decade” of the 1990s, when high growth 
went hand in hand with low inflation.  
The second inflationary factor, σ, is in turn strictly and positively corre-
lated with unemployment, i.e. when unemployment decreases, capacity utilisa-
tion increases and σ decreases. Parguez (2007b) ventures that this channel can 
provide an explanation for recent econometric findings showing the existence of 
a long-run inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment in the US, 
implying no trade-off between these two variables (Giovannoni (2007), quoted 
in Parguez (2007b)), a possibility noted at the time also by Sylos Labini (1967, 
p. 126), who argued that low inflation would avoid the need for inflation fuelling 
salary indexations, thus allowing for lower unemployment rates (see also Sylos 
Labini (1985 p. 570)). 
The above mark-up equation tracks the direct inflationary impact of an in-
terest rate increase through the factor λ. A “zero-inflation” policy pursued 
through increases in interest rates can produce inflation either directly via this 
factor λ or indirectly through the effect that lower capacity exerts on price in-
creases through the σ factor.  
Parguez (1991) presented an interesting model with one sector producing 
for consumption and the other for investment where the assumption of zero 
households savings allows to simplify the mark-up equations, getting a rate of 
mark-up in each sector exactly equal to the ratio between labour (for the con-
sumption good) and investment (for the investment good) allocated to the sectors 
of consumption and investment, a result already underlined by Graziani (1984b). 
The mark-ups are thus revealing the expectations of consumption and capital 
goods producers on the composition of effective demand (see also Seccarec-
cia (1984)). In the model of Parguez, the role of the central bank and of the 
commercial banking sector is made explicit, showing how, through the “valida-
tion constraint” (i.e. bank’s assessment of the value of firms based on the firm’s 
prospective rate of returns), the banking sector impacts on the mark-ups of the 
two production sectors. In this context, a zero inflation policy based on high in-
terest rates devised to increase unemployment so as to discourage salary in-
creases can produce “profit inflation”. In general profit inflation is often associ-
ated with unemployment, providing thus an explanation for stagflation, whereas Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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demand-pull inflation goes together with reduced unemployment that in the end 
stabilizes prices at a lower unemployment rate. The model is also used by Par-
guez to redefine the rationing concepts of Classical and Keynesian unemploy-
ment in a post-Keynesian circuit framework, examining how inflation can de-
velop in each case. 
 
5.  Kalecki’s savings-investment identity 
 
As argued above, the dynamic of money creation and destruction would nor-
mally bring the circuit out of the neo-classical equilibrium. The related inconsis-
tency between the goals of the participants in the economy is solved by a hierar-
chy between groups of individuals in their capacity to implement their economic 
plans. Households and enterprises are constrained by their expectations of future 
revenues: salary expectations for households, profit expectations for enterprises. 
In accordance with Kalecki’s principle that “workers spend what they earn, capi-
talists earn what they spend” (Kalecki (1933, pp. 21-23))
18, enterprises enjoy a 
larger freedom, because, as a group, they can always fulfil their expectations as 
long as the banking sector supports them. On the contrary, for households, wage 
progression is limited by the decisions on the level of economic activity taken by 
enterprises and endorsed by banks
19. Paradoxically, the only macroeconomic 
agent who has no limits in realising its expenditures targets is the State, who cre-
ates the money it needs through its expenditures and then destroys it with the 
collection of taxes.  
For Parguez, the purpose of economic policy is to reconcile the imbal-
ances due to the divergent expectations of household and enterprises, using its 
various powers, including, when necessary, a sufficiently large State deficit 
(Parguez (1990 and 2002))
20. Interpreted in terms of endogenous flows of mone-
tary creation and destruction (Parguez (1975, pp. 272-309)), the macroeconomic 
identity between savings and investments acquires a causal interpretation, with 
the arrow of causality going from investment to savings.
21 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking Kalecki’s principle applies to an economy with zero household’s savings. 
19 The crisis that recently hit the US residential sector can be viewed as the result of a change in 
the banking sector confidence in the capacity of households to sustain the levels of debt necessary 
to support the residential prices on the basis of which construction was undertaken in the first 
place. Its spread to the banking sector and the economy at large evidenced the loopholes existing 
in the system of banking supervision. 
20 The conclusion that in some situations it could be required to increase the public deficit is ob-
tained by the Nobel Memorial Prize William Vickrey starting from more strictly post-Keynesian 
premises, for instance in Vickrey (1994) and Vickrey (2000). 
21 “… l’inégalité entre l’investissement optimal et l’épargne optimale caractérise une économie 
monétaire; cette inégalité est dénouée de signification dans une économie idéale de troc” (Parguez, 
1975, p. 319). Massimo Cingolani 
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Independently anticipated by Kalecki (Robinson (1977)), the determina-
tion of savings by investments was one of Keynes’ most revolutionary discover-
ies, for which the General Theory failed to provide a sufficiently rigorous expla-
nation. It contrasted sharply with the then prevailing consensus on the Treasury 
view that savings determine investment and was denied fiercely by von Hayek. It 
is clear that Europe witnessed the hegemony of the Treasury view in the last 30 
years, which can be seen as a posthumous revenge of von Hayek on Keynes. The 
situation is different in the US where the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment 
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 requires the FED to look at the employment 
consequences of its monetary policy decisions (see J. Galbraith, 2006). 
 
The savings–investment identity is: 
S
Savings
=
← I
_
Investment
 
 
where the causality runs from investment to savings, reason for which invest-
ment is “capped”.  
 
Breaking it down into the 5 macroeconomic sectors of enterprises (e), house-
holds (h), banks (b), Government (g) and the foreign sector (f), it gives: 
 
Se + Sh + Sb + Sg + Sf =
←Ie + Ih + Ib + Ig + If  
 
Rearranging it to underline the sectoral saving balances it becomes: 
3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1
profits Banks
b b
need financing
Households
h h
deficit
Government
g g
surplus account
current BoP
f f
profits
s Entreprise
e e I S S I S I I S I S
 
   
 
       + − − + − = − + −
← . 
The identity simply states that if a sector realises a net saving position (saves 
more than it invests), another sector in the economy or abroad must have a net 
borrowing position: if, to simplify, the banking sector is “non-profit” and the 
Government reduces its deficit, other things equal, enterprises must also de-
crease profits, unless the reduced debt by the Government is compensated by an 
increase in households or foreign residents’ debt (current account surplus)
22. The 
                                                 
22 To simplify, the argument is developed as if debt was the only financial asset available beyond 
money. Strictly speaking one should talk only about financing need and financing capacity of the 
various sectors rather than in terms of their borrowing and lending capacity, except possibly for 
the Government. In this respect one can also note that the investment-saving identity above corre-
sponds to the equality between the “net lending” and “net borrowing” positions (S9) of the various Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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identity above is a variant of that presented in Kalecki (1954, Ch. 3) and is used 
by Bliek and Parguez (2007) and by Parguez (2007b) in their empirical assess-
ments reviewed in a forthcoming article.  
 
The first term on the left hand side of the equality represents net corporate profit 
(net increase in corporate debt if it is negative) and the second term the current 
account surplus of the balance of payments (addition to the country’s domestic 
sectors claims to foreign residents). The first term on the right hand side repre-
sents the Government deficit (excess of Government expenditures over taxes or 
net addition to public debt). The second term represents household’s net increase 
in debt (savings if negative). Consumption is already subtracted from this term 
as, as for all the other sectors, the identity is expressed in terms of net investment 
and net savings. For Parguez consumption has at least the same causal role as 
investment in sustaining effective demand since it affects net savings in the same 
way. The last term on the right side represents the banking sector’s profits, 
which depend essentially on the level of interest rates set by the central bank and 
on the bank’s mark-up. It corresponds to the variable R in the cost identity of 
section 5 and it is the channel through which the central bank can influence 
prices and distribution: ceteris paribus an increase in bank’s profits reduces 
firms’ profits, just like an increase in household’s or Government savings do. 
The hierarchy between the various sectors foreseen by the circuit, con-
firmed by the econometric results obtained by Giovannoni and Parguez (2007) 
for the US, explains the further layer of causality that goes from the Government 
deficit, private consumption and banking sector margins, on the right hand side 
of the identity, to corporate profits and the balance of payments current account 
on its left hand side (see also Parguez (2007b)). The latter results from the fact 
that in large industrial countries such as the US, or in general under free floating 
of the exchange rate, the foreign constraint does not bind. In other cases this 
term should move to the right hand side of the identity with a change in sign and 
become exogenous.  
The fact that the Government can influence firm’s expected profits im-
plies that, for a given exogenous level of the required mark-up, and thus of the 
employment multiplier, Government purchases can determine also the level of 
employment (see footnote 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
institutional sectors in the UN SNA93 national accounts, basis for the EU ESA95 accounts. There 
net lending is defined as representing the net amount a unit or a sector has available to finance, 
directly or indirectly, other units or other sectors. Massimo Cingolani 
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Conclusion  
 
The circuit helps orienting economic policy thinking in the complex reality of a 
world where the conditions for neo-classical equilibrium are not fulfilled, ration-
alising and extending the analyses initiated by Keynes. Whereas equilibrium 
approaches are often used implicitly or explicitly to provide “consensus” policy 
recommendations in support of an agenda that leaves little or no room for active 
economic policy action, the circuit shows how public intervention can be ana-
lysed and justified rigorously as a consequence of the expectational market fail-
ure that follows logically from the unsustainability and the associated irrele-
vance of equilibrium positions in real world applications (Kirman (1989), 
Ackermann (2002), Petri and Hahn (2003), Roncaglia (2005)). In the circuit, as 
in all non-walrasian situations, prices do not achieve the separation of the con-
sumers’ and of the producers’ decisions (Koopmans (1957)). This also implies 
that the separation between allocation and distribution, holding in optimal posi-
tions, cannot be achieved either. Money is the mean that achieves some form of 
imperfect coordination in a world where decentralised decisions cannot guaran-
tee optimal coordination. In such a sub-optimal world, micro-policy actions, par-
ticularly in the field of investment, acquire a macro-economic dimension 
through their causal impact on savings, a possibility that does not exist under the 
neo-classical hypotheses. Because of this causality and because distribution 
feeds back on allocation and growth, the circuit, seen as emblematic of monetary 
non-walrasian equilibria, can bring support to a coordination of European fiscal 
policies around an objective of full employment, which it shows to be both a 
possible and a desirable objective.  
While providing arguments for active policy intervention, the circuit also 
helps drawing a line between policies that increase national wealth and those 
that feed inflation. For instance it illustrates very clearly that the monetary crea-
tion associated with a new and fully justified public investment financed by 
credit represents a net creation of value in real terms and should therefore not be 
automatically rejected on fiscal stability or anti-inflationary grounds.  
It is also consistent with the fact that with uncertainty, as opposed to risk, 
no rational calculus can apprehend the future. Therefore the identity between 
risk and profit breaks down and it is no longer possible to meaningfully distin-
guish profit from rent or quasi-rent. Policies officially targeted at restoring prof-
itability therefore risk feeding rent instead of supporting genuine entrepreneurial 
risk-taking. As demonstrated recently, in the absence of stringent ethical stan-
dards and strong regulation, they can contribute to the accumulation of danger-
ous financial imbalances. 
Whereas the circuit sheds light on the rather opaque role of money in the 
neoclassical model, other approaches deriving from the classical tradition, but 
relying more on microeconomics, address important policy issues difficult to Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy: I. A Perspective.. 
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apprehend within the mainstream approach, such as the effect of technical pro-
gress or environment on growth (Pasinetti (1981), Kurz and Salvadori (1995), 
Petri (2004), Schefold (1997b)). The synthesis between these converging analy-
ses progressed substantially in the last three decades (Harcourt (1996-97)), but is 
still under development. Lavoie (2006) assesses the progress optimistically 
whereas Davidson (2005) is more negative. It is to be hoped that the construc-
tion of this synthesis will progress further as a cultural by-product of, and in par-
allel with, EU integration, since there is still a need for a conceptual tool that 
would allow to compare convincingly the effects of different policy measures, 
for instance to build a shared vision of the type of macroeconomic coordination 
to be sought in Europe.  
Meanwhile, the use of approaches that have the capacity to provide ana-
lytical support for alternative forms of active policy intervention appears inevi-
table to practically oriented people. As will be shown in a forthcoming article, 
the available tools provided by the circuit are very useful for this purpose, as 
they are consistent with a large body of empirical evidence and allow for mean-
ingful interpretations of macroeconomic data. 
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